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NUCCIO v. NUCCIO: THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL WILL NOT BAR
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DEFENSE IN A CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASE INVOLVING REPRESSED
MEMORY
I. INTRODUCTION
Kathleen Nuccio alleged that she was sexually abused by her fa-
ther when she was three years old.' He continued to sexually abuse
her for ten long years.' He threatened her life when he held a chisel
to her throat and vowed to kill her if she ever told anyone of the
abuse.' Luke Nuccio not only sexually defiled his daughter but also
verbally abused her and physically beat her until she was seventeen
years old.4 One such beating caused damage so severe to Kath-
leen's ear that she was forced to have surgery.'
Kathleen never spoke of the abuse during the first forty years of
her life.6 Instead, the truth remained locked up inside of her.
Rather than dealing with the reality of the abuse and the subsequent
feelings of fear, humiliation, and isolation, Kathleen repressed her
memories of the horrors that she had suffered at the hands of her
father.7 When memories of the abuse began to reveal themselves to
her, the law told her it was too late and that nothing could be done.
The message is unambiguous and abhorrent to reason: a father may
steal his daughter's innocence and memory and never be held le-
gally responsible for his actions.
Kathleen Nuccio, at the age of forty-four, filed suit to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress for sexual abuse allegedly
inflicted upon her as a child by her father.' Kathleen told the court
that she experienced traumatic amnesia for over thirty years.9 Luke
Nuccio moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limita-
tions.' 0 After the United States District Court for the District of
Maine granted the motion, Kathleen appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Finding no clear and control-
1. See Brief of the Appellant at 2, Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331 (Me. 1996)
(No. Fed-95-518).
2. See i
3. See id at 3.
4. See id
5. See id
6. See id. at 1.
7. See id. at 4.
8. See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 62 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1995).
9. See id
10. See id
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ling precedent in state law, the court of appeals certified a question
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court."
The case presented the issue of whether equitable estoppel barred
Luke Nuccio from raising the statute of limitations defense because
Kathleen's childhood memories of sexual abuse remained repressed
as a result of her father's threats and acts of violence." The Law
Court held that Luke Nuccio should not be estopped from raising
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense."
Generally, this Note considers the various legal and equitable
remedies available to an adult who has repressed memories of child-
hood sexual abuse, including the procedural and substantive bur-
dens that she faces in asserting her claim. Part II considers the
phenomenon of repressed memory resulting from childhood sexual
abuse. Part III discusses the historical and procedural background
of the subject case in the context of the statute of limitations, the
delayed discovery rule, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel in
Maine and other jurisdictions. Part IV reviews the Nuccio decision
and the reasons equitable estoppel cannot apply in cases of child
sexual abuse when the victim has repressed her memories. Part V
recommends that courts invoke fraudulent concealment, an equita-
ble principle, to bar a defendant's statute of limitations affirmative
defense in abuse cases involving repression when legal remedies and
equitable estoppel are otherwise unavailable. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that, although the Law Court's decision in Nuccio to deny
Kathleen relief based on equitable estoppel was justifiable, the court
should invoke an equitable remedy, like fraudulent concealment, in
favor of victims with repressed memories who were abused prior to
1991 until the Legislature extends the discovery rule to the prior
statute of limitations.
11. See id. at 17-18. The question was certified pursuant to title 4, section 57 of
the Maine Revised Statutes which provides, in pertinent part:
When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, or to any
court of appeals or district court of the United States, that there are in-
volved in any proceeding before it one or more questions of law of this
State, which may be determinative of the cause, and there are no clear
controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court, such
federal court may certify any such question of law of this State to the
Supreme Judicial Court for instructions concerning such question of state
law, which certificate the Supreme Judicial Court may, by written opinion,
answer.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (West 1989). See also M. R. Crv. P. 76B (judicial
procedure for certified questions).
12. Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1332 (Me. 1996).
13. See id. at 1335.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF REPRESSION IN CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE
Despite the prevalence and severity of child sexual abuse,14
American society has only recently begun to acknowledge the prob-
lem and take steps to prevent abuse, protect the abused, and edu-
cate communities about this social malady. 15  Traditionally,
skepticism and disbelief have surrounded charges of childhood sex-
ual abuse, causing the abused to feel isolated and ashamed even af-
ter the abuse has ceased. Fortunately, increased media coverage
and national awareness of childhood sexual abuse has resulted in
greater opportunity for legal redress and has encouraged victims to
expose their secrets and their abusers. 16
Cases of child sexual abuse often include an element of repres-
sion. The study of the "repressed memory" phenomenon' 7 dates
back to the turn of the century "when Sigmund Freud theorized that
the conscious mind can push away, or repress, anxiety-provoking
ideas. When submerged, he said, potent memories can cause both
physical and mental symptoms."' 8 Similarly, studies and observa-
tions by philosopher and psychologist William James in 1891 indi-
cated that "strong emotions (whether positive or negative) produce
14. See generally Andrew Vachss, If We Really Want To Protect Children,
PARADE, Nov. 3, 1996, at 5 (discussing the rise in reported incidents of child sexual
abuse over the last two decades).
15. See generally Gregory G. Gordon, Comment, Adult Survivors of Childhood
Sexual Abuse and the Statute of Limitations: The Need For Consistent Application of
the Delayed Discovery Rule, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 1359, 1363 (1993) (explaining that
"[e]xperts believe that as many as one in three American females and one in six
males are sexually abused during childhood").
16. See Vachss, supra note 14, at 5. Vachss describes the continual metamorpho-
sis of public opinion and reaction to child sexual abuse:
Like a pendulum, press coverage swung from one extreme to the other.
From being reported so rarely that many doubted its very existence, child
abuse became such a frequent subject of coverage that rarely a day went by
without new accounts of horrors.
Now the media spotlight has been turned on defendants who maintain
that they have been falsely accused of sexually abusing children ....
Id.
17. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Bad Science: Repressed and Recovered
Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 517, 520 (1996) (defining
repressed memory as the "complete absence of awareness or memory of a traumatic
event from the time of its occurrence until a period of years thereafter. The person
purportedly experiencing the trauma buries the memory deep in his or her mind to
avoid the troubling emotions associated with the memory of the trauma." (citing
Donald J. Hirsh & Susan Elbin, Repressed and Recovered Memories of Childhood
Sexual Abuse, FOR THE DF., Aug. 1994, at 20, 23)).
18. Nancy Wartik, A Question of Abuse, AM. HEALTH, May 1993, at 62,64. War-
tik explained that Freud, in his early work, concluded that many of the women he
worked with, who possessed mental and emotional symptoms, had been abused chil-
dren. Freud subsequently revoked this theory of repression by saying that memories
of sexual abuse were fantasies. See id.
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strong memories, less subject to distortion and decay than normal
memory."' 9 Today, the psychology profession remains divided
about whether the human mind can effectively and accurately recall
repressed memories from childhood. 0 In fact, due to the lack of
available empirical data supporting the existence of repressed mem-
ory, some skeptics challenge the concept of repression altogether.2 I
In an effort to characterize the various psychological effects of
child sexual abuse, scholars have labeled the psychological and emo-
tional reactions common to survivors, such as denial, dissociation,
and amnesia, as "Post-Incest Syndrome."'  Post-Incest Syndrome is
comparable to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in that both
are responses to traumatic events so severe that the individual un-
consciously invokes psychological defense mechanisms to escape the
physical trauma. 3 The "essential feature of [P'rSD] is the develop-
ment of characteristic symptoms" after experiencing or witnessing
"an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury,
or other threat to one's physical integrity."24 Theoretically, these
19. MARK PENDERGRAST, VIcMihS OF MEMORY 105 (2d ed. 1996). See also,
State v. Hungerford, Nos. 94-S-045 to 94-S-047, 93-S-1734 to 93-S-1936, 1995 WI.
378571 (N.H. Sup. CL May 23, 1995). Expounding on William James's theory and
discussing the scientific validity of recovered memory research done by Harvard psy-
chiatrist Bessel van der Kolk, the Hungerford court wrote:
Recent laboratory research has explored the theory that traumatic memory
may be processed differently than ordinary memory. This theory incorpo-
rates the concepts of childhood memory development from a behavioral to
a narrative memory system. Through a series of PET scans of the human
brain during the occurrence of flashbacks, Dr. van der Kolk claims to have
provided biological evidence that traumatic memory is in fact processed
differently than ordinary memory. Based on his studies, Dr. van der Kolk
believes traumatic memory is sensual and emotional, and like childhood
behavioral memory, cannot be verbalized on a narrative level. Traumatic
memory may not be as accessible as ordinary memory and it may be neces-
sary to reinstate the emotional level of consciousness experienced during
the trauma in order to retrieve the memory. These studies represent the
"cutting edge" of present traumatic memory research.
Id. at *8.
20. See PENDERGRASr, supra note 19, at 79-80 (noting that experimental psychol-
ogists discredit the repression theory because there is no scientific proof while
clinical psychologists maintain that there is proof of repression in the words of the
survivors themselves).
21. See id. at 81-87.
22. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 1366.
23. See generally Jocelyn B. Lamm, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victns:
Toward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189,
2192-95 (1991) (describing the traditional pattern of classic psychological responses
to childhood incestuous abuse).
24. A mRICAN PsYcmATRIc ASS'N DIAGNosTIc AND STAT. MANUAL OF
MENTAL DSORDERS, 424 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IVI. According to the
DSM-IV, "[t]he characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to the extreme
trauma include persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event . . ., persistent
avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsive-
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reactions tend to help victims deal with the trauma during the pe-
riod of the abusive behavior.' Potentially, a person may continue
to "employ these defense mechanisms well into adulthood."26
While biologists seek to understand the workings of memory re-
covery, clinical studies on repression have convinced many research-
ers of the mind's ability to repress traumatic memories for long
periods of time.27 Supporters of repressed memory, who liken re-
pression to PTSD, argue that "[w]hen a person has been repeatedly
traumatized, as some abuse victims have been, he is likelier to suffer
from amnesia... '[because] if someone has access to hurt you again
and again, you can anticipate what's going to happen and muster up
very amazing defenses against it."' 8 Although believers of the re-
pression phenomenon tend to agree that repression may cease to be
helpful in adult life, these defenses often become a way of life for
the victims, effectively preventing the traumatic event from pene-
trating the victim's consciousness for long periods of time.29 Con-
versely, disbelievers argue that memories are suggestible and
malleable and can be distorted by books, magazines, movies, and
other social influences.30 They also contend that therapists, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, encourage women to believe that they
ness .. ., and persistent symptoms of increased arousal . .. ." Id. See also Alan
Rosenfeld, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: The
Equitable Estoppel Remedy, 12 HARV. WorcmN's L.J. 206,208-10 (1989) (comparing
Post-Incest Syndrome to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder).
25. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 1366.
26. Id. Gordon notes that "child victims ... are slowly conditioned into a pattern
of submission and silence which allows the abuse to continue over an extended pe-
riod of time ... often [causing] the child to develop feelings of helplessness and guilt
or responsibility... which in turn, further prevent the child from breaking the si-
lence." Id. at 1364.
27. See, eg., Minouche Kandel & Eric Kandel, Flights of Memory, DiscovER,
May 1994, at 32. Although biology cannot yet explain "what might happen in
human brains when memories are repressed, or when they are recovered[,] ... biol-
ogy can provide insights into how a memory is stored, how that storage is regulated,
and whether this regulation is compatible with repression and with a later return of
memory." Id. at 36.
28. Wartik, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting Dr. Lenore Terr, a professor of psychia-
try at the University of California at San Francisco).
29. See Kandel & Kandel, supra note 27, at 34. The article notes the efforts of
Linda Meyer Williams, a sociologist at the University of New Hampshire, to track
and provide evidence of memory repression. The research involved studying the
hospital records of 129 women who were treated for sexual abuse while they were
young girls, in the mid-seventies, and later asking these women to discuss any abuse
they experienced as children. Meyer's research concluded that:
More than one-third had no memory of, or chose not to report, the moles-
tation documented in their medical records. Since over half of these wo-
men discussed other incidents of sexual abuse, selective amnesia is a more
likely explanation for their response (or lack of it) than any unwillingness
to discuss sex.
Id.
30. See PENDERGRAST, supra note 19, at 94.
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were abused, to reconstruct their pasts, and to rehearse it in their
minds until it becomes real to them.31
Judicial wariness in deciding cases of child sexual abuse involving
repressed memory generally stems from the lack of empirical evi-
dence supporting the theory of repression. In addition, courts are
concerned about the validity of therapeutic techniques, such as hyp-
nosis, used in retrieving memories from abuse victims who experi-
ence traumatic amnesia.32 Ultimately, the courts are concerned
about the conglomerate of therapy issues, namely "the preconcep-
tions of the therapist, the suggestibility of the patient, the aleatory
nature of memory recall, and the need to find a clear culprit for a
diffuse set of symptoms, [which] may lead to false memories" and
hence, false allegations.33 Nevertheless, courts nationwide face an
increasing number of abuse cases each year and continue to reach
decisions seemingly as varied as the facts of each case.
I. Nucc10 v. NuccIO: CHILD SEXUAL ABUsE JURISPRUDENCE
In Nuccio v. NuccioI Kathleen Nuccio brought an action for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from repeated sexual
abuse allegedly inflicted upon her by her father from the age of
three to the age of thirteen." She delayed filing her claim for ap-
proximately thirty-two years after the last alleged incident of sexual
abuse or assault. Kathleen contended that this delay was due to
traumatic amnesia, which caused her to repress her memories of the
abuse until 1992.36 Luke Nuccio raised the statute of limitations as
an affirmative defense.37
After the United States District Court for the District of Maine
granted summary judgment in favor of Luke based on the statute of
limitations, Kathleen appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit.38 On its own motion, the court of appeals
certified the following question to the Law Court:
31. See id.
32. See id. at 121 (explaining that "memories retrieved under hypnosis are sus-
pect [because] the very definition of the process ... invariably includes the concept
of suggestion").
33. S.V. v. RV., 933 S.W.2d 1, 18 (Tex. 1996). The Supreme Court of Texas ex-
plained that, "[flor purposes of applying the discovery rule, expert testimony on
subjects about which there is no settled scientific view-indeed, not even a majority
scientific view--cannot provide objective verification of abuse." t.
34. 62 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995).
35. See Brief of Appellee at 2, Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331 (Me. 1996) (No.
FED-95-518).
36. See id.; see also Brief of the Appellant at 5, Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331
(Me. 1996) (No. FED-95-518).
37. See Brief of Appellee at 6.
38. See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 62 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995).
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Does a showing that a plaintiff, who was the victim of child-
hood sexual abuse, suffered repressed memory as a result of a
defendant's threats of violence and generally violent nature,
her witnessing acts of violence by the defendant, and her fear
of the defendant, provide a basis for the application of equita-
ble estoppel so as effectively to toll the statute of limitations
during the period that the plaintiff's memories remain
repressed? 39
The Law Court answered in the negative and affirmed summary
judgment in favor of Luke, declining to invoke equitable principles
to bar the statute of limitations affirmative defense.
0
A. Statutes of Limitations
1. The Effect of Statutes of Limitations in Child Sexual Abuse
Civil Suits
Until the last half of this century, childhood sexual abuse was
rarely discussed.4 Today, however, it is not uncommon for survi-
vors of such abuse to "demand accountability from their abusers" by
filing civil suits.4' Civil remedies can benefit survivors by providing
compensation for lost wages and the costs of long-term psychother-
apy.43 However, child sexual abuse survivors are often denied the
opportunity to reveal the facts of the abuse in court because their
claims are not filed within the time allotted by the statute of
limitations.'
Statutes of limitations are legislatively imposed time limits that
require plaintiffs to fie civil suits within a specified time period.45
With these statutes, legislatures define that time period in terms of
when the cause of action accrues. 46 In many cases, the meaning of
"accrues" raises dispute because interpretations are varied and stat-
utory language is ambiguous.47 Depending on the cause of action
39. Id. at 18.
40. See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1335 (Me. 1996).
41. See, e.g., Kandel & Kandel, supra note 27, at 32 (noting that "[u]ntil the early
1970s the sexual abuse of children was largely ignored: their stories were doubted
and minimized, or they were blamed for encouraging their molestation").
42. Gordon, supra note 15, at 1369.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Lamm, supra note 23, at 2190 (arguing that victims of sexual abuse,
because of the psychological reactions that they suffer, are often unable to file a civil
tort claim within the statutory time frame). For further discussion on statutes of
limitations as a legal barrier for childhood sexual abuse survivors, see generally Ro-
senfeld, supra note 24.
45. See Lamm, supra note 23, at 2196.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). Faced with varied construc-
tions of the applicable statute of limitations presented by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, the United States Supreme Court examined in detail the point at
which the employee, in fairness, should have known of his illness and its connection
[Vol. 49:235
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and the jurisdiction, "[s]ome statutes specify that [the action ac-
crues] .. on the date that the incident causing the damage occurred.
Others specify that the statute begins to run on the date that the
plaintiff discovers that the damages are caused by a particular ac-
tion." Finally, some statutes do not define accrual at all and thus
permit judicial interpretation of accrual on a case by case basis. 49
The primary purposes of statutes of limitations are to establish a
point of repose and to terminate stale claims.5" According to courts
in some jurisdictions, the "primary consideration underlying all stat-
utes of limitations is undoubtedly one of fairness to the defend-
ant.""1  Nevertheless, courts recognize that these legislatively
imposed time limits often sacrifice logic for practicality and effi-
ciency, furthermore, courts note that statutes of limitations "are by
definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate be-
tween the just and unjust claim, or the avoidable and unavoidable
delay. ''5
to his employment to determine when the employee's cause of action would have
accrued. See id. at 168-71.
48. Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 211.
49. See iL
50. See S.V. v. RV., 933 S.W2d 1 (Tex. 1996). The Supreme Court of Texas
stated the important policy considerations behind statutes of limitations:
"Limitations statutes afford plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reason-
able time to present their claims and protect defendants and the courts
from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seri-
ously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance
of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise."
S.V. v. RV., 933 S.W.2d at 3 (quoting Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800
S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990)).
51. Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 211. See, eg., Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631, 634
(Wash. 1969). The Supreme Court of Washington stated:
Statutes of limitation, although having their origins in legislative proceed-
ings--aside from equitable principles of laches and estoppel-thus contem-
plate that a qualified freedom from unending harassment of judicial
process is one of the hallmarks of justice. No civilized society could lay
claim to an enlightened judicial system which puts no limits on the time in
which a person can be compelled to defend against claims brought in good
faith, much less whatever stale, illusory, false, fraudulent or malicious accu-
sations of civil wrong might be leveled against him.
Id.
52. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). In this oft-quoted
opinion, Justice Jackson stated:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience
rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles.
They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation
of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories
have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been
lost... They have come into the law not through the judicial process but
through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to
litigate. Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a
"fundamental" right or what used to be called a "natural" right of the indi-
vidual. He may, of course, have the protection of the policy while it exists,
244 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:235
In child sexual abuse civil cases, statutes of limitations impose a
tremendous burden on plaintiffs whose repressed memories of the
abuse are not recalled until the statutory time limit has expired. For
instance, in Smith v. Smith,53 a thirty-two year old claimant brought
an action against her father alleging that he had repeatedly sexually
abused her until she was twelve years old.54 The daughter con-
tended that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder which
"caused her to repress her memories of the incestuous occurrences
of her childhood and disabled her from instituting litigation which
might stimulate a traumatic recall of the childhood events. '55 Be-
cause New York law does not specifically address repressed memory
in childhood sexual abuse cases, the plaintiff argued that she was
insane as a result of the abuse. 6 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, applying New York law, held that the
plaintiff "was not insane" within the meaning of the law and that the
statute of limitations applicable to the daughter's action against her
father could not be tolled.57
Pursuant to the language of the New York statute,5" the Smith
court concluded that the statute applied only to those individuals
"who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an over-all
inability to function in society."59 Under New York law, "[t]he stat-
but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legisla-
tive grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative
control.
Id (citation and footnote omitted).
53. 830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987).
54. See id at 12.
55. Id
56.. See id
57. Id
58. New York has no statutory delayed discovery rule for child sexual abuse of-
fenses. Hence, the victim in Smith filed suit pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (McKin-
ney 1990):
If a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of
infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, and the time
otherwise limited for commencing the action is three years or more and
expires no later than three years after the disability ceases, or the person
under the disability dies, the time within which the action must be com-
menced shall be extended to three years after the disability ceases or the
person under the disability dies, whichever event first occurs; if the time
otherwise limited is less than three years, the time shall be extended by the
period of disability. The time within which the action must be commenced
shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten years after the cause of
action accrues, except, in any action other than for medical, dental or
podiatric malpractice, where the person was under a disability due to in-
fancy. This section shall not apply to an action to recover a penalty or
forfeiture, or against a sheriff or other officer for an escape.
Id.
59. Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d at 12 (quoting McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
435 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (N.Y. 1980)).
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ute... cannot be interpreted as providing a toll of the Statute of
Limitations to an individual claiming a mere post traumatic neuro-
sis."'  Thus, in New York, the absence of legislation specifically ad-
dressing claims of childhood sexual abuse renders a survivor of such
abuse alleging repressed memory powerless against the defendant's
statute of limitations defense. The court's interpretation of the New
York statute expressly excludes "post traumatic neurosis" from the
definition of insanity. New York law provides an example of how
statutes of limitations can effectively punish the survivor for what
may appear to be a lack of diligence in filing a claim when, in fact,
"her inability to initiate the legal action is a direct result of child-
hood sexual abuse." 61
2. The Effect of Maine's Statute of Limitations in Nuccio
In Maine, the Law Court has recognized that the "statute of limi-
tations represents a balance of several competing interests."' Stat-
utes of limitations provide plaintiffs with the opportunity to pursue
meritorious claims and grant defendants eventual repose and pro-
tection from defending stale claims, which often involve "faded
memories, dead or otherwise unavailable witnesses, and lost or de-
stroyed evidence."63 The statute of limitations for civil actions in
Maine provides, in pertinent part: "All civil actions shall be com-
menced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues and not af-
terwards. . .. "I
Pursuant to title 1, section 731 and title 14, section 85366 of the
Maine Revised Statutes, the accrual date of Kathleen Nuccio's ac-
tion was extended until the year she attained majority in 1969.67
60. McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 435 N.E2d at 1075. This case signaled
the increasing reluctance of New York courts to construe the term "insanity" liber-
ally. The McCarthy court noted that the "tolling provisions should not readily be
given an expansive interpretation tending to undermine the basic purpose behind
Statutes of Limitation." Id. at 1074.
61. Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 212. Mr. Rosenfeld states: "Current law has an
unconscionable effect in that it rewards abusers when their actions cause the victim
to be severely traumatized, thereby decreasing the survivor's ability to sue, by pro-
viding a shield from liability." l
62. Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 994 (Me. 1982).
63. Id
64. Mn. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 OVest 1980).
65. ME. RE-V. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 73 (Vest 1989) ("[P]ersons 18 years of age or
over are declared to be of majority for all purposes.").
66. ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 853 (West Supp. 1996-1997). This section pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
If a person entitled to bring any of the actions under sections 752 to 754....
851, [and] 852 ... is a minor, mentally ill, imprisoned or without the limits
of the United States when the cause of action accrues, the action may be
brought within the times limited herein after the disability is removed.
Id.
67. See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1334 (Me. 1996).
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Thus, under the statute of limitations for civil actions in place at the
time Kathleen was allegedly abused, she had six years, upon attain-
ing majority, to file her claim. Therefore, because Kathleen Nuccio
failed to file her claim six years after she attained majority and, in
fact, did not file her claim until approximately twenty-three years
after she attained majority, and thirty-two years after the last al-
leged assault, her claim was subsequently barred by the statute of
limitations in 1975.1
B. Delayed Discovery Rules
1. The Development of the Delayed Discovery Rule and Its
Application in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
In light of the burden imposed by statutes of limitations, adult
survivors of child sexual abuse who suffered from repressed memory
have generally relied upon delayed discovery rules to avoid having
their claims barred by statutes of limitations.69 In general, delayed
discovery rules provide that "a statute of limitations does not begin
to run until the plaintiff, using reasonable diligence, would have dis-
covered the cause of action."7 The seminal cases on the delayed
discovery rule are Ruth v. Dight "' and Urie v. Thompson,72 which
recognize the inherent injustice in imposing rigid time restrictions
on plaintiffs who are unaware of the harm, or the cause of the harm,
inflicted upon them until after the statute of limitations has run.
In Ruth, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against
her surgeon's estate and the hospital for negligently leaving a surgi-
cal sponge in her abdomen for over twenty years, causing her recur-
ring pain and discomfort. 73 The plaintiff was unaware that the
sponge was in her body and thus was unable to attribute her pain
and discomfort to the negligence of the doctor until the sponge was
discovered more than twenty years later during an exploratory oper-
ation.74 The Supreme Court of Washington adopted the discovery
rule after balancing the harm to a surgical patient of being "de-
prived of a remedy" versus the harm to the defendant surgeon of
being sued twenty-two years after he performed allegedly negligent
surgery.75 The court reasoned that principles of "fundamental fair-
ness" afforded the plaintiff the right to go forward with her claim.76
68. The Law Court concluded that "no other statutory provision applies to toll
the limitation of the statute" in this case. Id.
69. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 1375.
70. Tyson v. "Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227 (Wash. 1986) (citing U.S. Oil & Ref. Co. v.
State, 633 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Wash. 1981)). See generally Gordon, supra note 15.
71. 453 P.2d 631 (Wash. 1969).
72. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
73. See Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d at 633.
74. See id.
75. IaL at 635.
76. Id. at 634, 636.
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In Urie, the plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act against his employer after being diagnosed with silicosis, a
pulmonary disease.' After thirty years of working as a fireman on
steam locomotives and having continuously inhaled "silica dust
blown or sucked into the cabs of the locomotives on which he had
worked," the plaintiff argued that the defendant, by the exercise of
due care, should have known of the dangers of such conditions.7"
The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applied because the
plaintiff did not know of his injury, and the causal connection of that
injury to the defendant's conduct, until years after his employment
with the company had terminated and the statute of limitations had
expired.79 The Court stated: "We do not think the humane legisla-
tive plan intended such consequences to attach to blameless
ignorance."'
Although the discovery rule has been applied to professional mal-
practice and employer liability cases like those discussed above,
courts were initially reluctant to employ the rule in childhood sexual
abuse cases involving repression, due to both insufficient evidence
of abuse and lack of empirical evidence validating the repressed
memory theory.8' Nevertheless, an extensive study conducted in
1993 reported that approximately "twenty-one states allow the stat-
ute of limitations to be tolled in civil cases where a victim of child
sexual abuse has repressed all memory of the incident."'s According
to this study, "[t]hese numbers are especially remarkable since as
late as 1986 no states allowed such cases."'  The national trend of
enacting legislation, such as discovery rules, to toll the statute of
limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases continues to grow in
spite of the inconclusiveness of repressed memory research.84
77. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. at 165-66.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 170.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. See, eg., Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories
Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory
Repression, 84 J. Crm. L. & CRUIMNOLOGY 129, 154 (1993). This article suggests
that, because of the unreliability of repressed memories, courts should "implement
procedural safeguards to minimize injustice occurring at the expense of an innocent
defendant." Id. at 132.
82. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Many states have adopted legislation tolling the statute of limitations for civil
suits alleging childhood sexual abuse including, but not limited to: Alaska (three
years after discovery), ALAsKA STAT. § 09.10.140(b)(1)-(2) (Michie 1996); Arkansas
(three years after discovery), AmK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130(a)-(b)(1) (Michie Supp.
1995); California (three years after discovery), CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 340.1 (%Vest
Supp. 1997); Colorado (six years after discovery), CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-
103.7 (Bradford Supp. 1996); Florida (four years after discovery), FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 95.11(7) (Vest Supp. 1997); Iowa (four years after discovery), IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 614.8A (West Supp. 1996); Kansas (three years after discovery), KAN. STAT. ANN.
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One of the first childhood sexual abuse cases to involve the dis-
covery rule was Tyson v. Tyson. 5 In Tyson, the plaintiff alleged that
she was sexually abused by her father between the ages of three and
eleven.86 She "further alleged that the sexual assaults caused her to
suppress any memory of the acts and that she did not remember the
alleged acts until she entered psychological therapy during 1983." 87
The arguments set forth by the Tyson majority and dissent pro-
foundly demonstrate the early struggle that the judicial system had
with the concept of repressed memory and childhood sexual abuse.
In short, the majority held that the "discovery rule does not apply to
an intentional tort claim where the plaintiff has blocked the incident
from her conscious memory during the period of the statute of limi-
tations."88 The majority based its decision on the lack of "empirical,
verifiable evidence" available to support the alleged sexual abuse.89
§ 60-523 (1994); Maine (six years after discovery), ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,§ 752-C (West Supp. 1996-1997); Missouri (three years after discovery), Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.046 (West Supp. 1997); Montana (three years after discovery), MoNT.
CODE ANr. § 27-2-216(l)(b) (1995); New Hampshire (three year discovery rule for
all civil actions), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (Supp. 1996); Nevada (ten years
after discovery), NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11.215 (Michie Supp. 1993); New Mexico
(three years after discovery), N.M. STAT. AN'N. § 37-1-30 (Michie Supp. 1996); Ore-
gon (three years after discovery), OR. REv. STAT. § 12.117 (1995); Rhode Island
(seven years after discovery), R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1996); South Dakota(three years after discovery), S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 26-10-25 (Michie 1992); Ver-
mont (six years after discovery), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (Supp. 1996).
85. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
86. See id. at 227.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 230.
89. Id. at 229. The Tyson majority stated that the plaintiff's "claim rests on a
subjective assertion that wrongful acts occurred and that injuries resulted. There is
no objective manifestation of these allegations. Rather, they are based on plaintiff's
alleged recollection of a memory long buried in the unconscious which she asserts
was triggered by psychological therapy." Id. See also S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1
(Tex. 1996). In SV. v. R.V., the Supreme Court of Texas held that an alleged survi-
vor of childhood sexual abuse could not invoke the discovery rule to bar her father
from raising the statute of limitations because the alleged survivor "adduced no evi-
dence of abuse." Id. at 3. This court explained that a "principal factor in deciding
whether to apply the discovery rule has been to what extent the claim was objec-
tively verifiable." Id. at 6. In addition, expert testimony was deemed insufficient to
supply the objective verification of wrong and injury necessary for application of the
discovery rule, primarily due to the survivor's inability to provide evidence of abuse
and to the scientific community's inability to reach "consensus on how to gauge the
truth or falsity of 'recovered' memories." Id. at 18; State v. Hungerford, Nos. 94-S-
045 to 94-S-047, 93-S-1734 to 93-S-1936, 1995 WL 378571 (N.H. Sup. Ct. May 23,
1995). In Hungerford, the Superior Court of New Hampshire did not admit the
victims' testimony as to their memory of the alleged abuse because the "reliability of
the phenomenon" of repressed memory had not been established. Id. at *11. Fur-
thermore, the court maintained that under the Frye test, "the process of therapy
used in these cases to recover the memories, ha[sJ not gained general acceptance in
the field of psychology; and [is] not scientifically reliable." Id. at *1.
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According to the dissent, however, "objective, verifiable" proof of
the abuse was not a prerequisite for the imposition of the discovery
rule and thus should not have been an issue before the court.9°
While underscoring the importance of the discovery rule in child-
hood sexual abuse cases involving repressed memory, the dissent
maintained that, "[flundamental fairness, not availability of objec-
tive evidence, has always been the linchpin of the discovery rule."91
Consequently, "[i]n 1988, two years after the Washington Supreme
Court's decision in Tyson, the Washington state legislature enacted
legislation to provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations
through the discovery rule in sexual abuse cases."'
The first reported court decision successfully invoking the discov-
ery rule to toll the statute of limitations in a child sexual abuse case
was Hammer v. Hammer.93 In this case, the survivor of the alleged
abuse had two years to bring a cause of action once she had attained
the age of eighteen.94 The plaintiff subsequently brought her cause
of action when she was twenty-one, almost two years after the stat-
ute of limitations had run.9' Although the plaintiff in Hammer had
not repressed memories of the abuse, she maintained that she had
developed defense mechanisms to cope with the shock and had thus
been unable to recognize the harmful effects of the alleged abuse
until ten years later. 6 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
the discovery rule applied, reasoning that the rule was "formulated
to avoid the harsh results produced by commencing the running of
the statute of limitations before a claimant was aware of any basis
for an action. '9 7
Still, some courts take a stricter approach than the Hammer court
and maintain that the discovery rule can only be invoked if the
plaintiff alleges with sufficient specificity that she repressed her
90. Iyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 231-32 (Pearson, J., dissenting). The dissent ar-
gued, in response to the majority's evidentiary requirement in Tyson, that:
[A]ctions which essentially turn on credibility of the parties are not unique.
The trier of fact frequently is asked to determine the outcome of a lawsuit
by deciding which party is telling the truth.... It is illogical to foreclose a
cause of action alleging sexual abuse just because the parties' credibility
will be determinative, when such "swearing contests" are common in other
contexts.
Id. at 231-32.
91. Id. at 231 (Pearson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The Tyson dissent con-
tended that the discovery rule "is applicable to complaints alleging negligence and
intentional torts by adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse where the trier of fact
finds that the plaintiff has repressed all conscious memory of such abuse during the
entire period of the statute of limitations." Id at 235.
92. Gordon, supra note 15, at 1379.
93. 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
94. See iL at 24 n.4.
95. See id
96. See id. at 25.
97. Id. at 26.
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memories of the abuse. For instance, in DeRose v. Carswell,9" the
plaintiff brought an action against her step-grandfather for alleged
child sexual abuse, contending that the discovery rule should apply
because "she did not appreciate until recently the causal relation-
ship between the alleged assaults and her emotional injuries, even
though she was aware of the assaults."'  The California Court of
Appeals for the Sixth District held that, because the plaintiff was
"actually aware long ago of the facts necessary to state a cause of
action against Carswell based upon the sexual assaults," and be-
cause she did not allege that she repressed her memories of the
abuse, the plaintiff could not invoke the discovery rule.100
2. Maine's Delayed Discovery Rule and Its Limitations in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases: Nuccio and Its Predecessors
Under Maine law, the discovery rule has its origin in title 14, sec-
tions 752-A' 0 ' and 859102 of the Maine Revised Statutes, tolling the
statute of limitations for malpractice actions against design profes-
sionals and tolling the statute of limitations until an aggrieved party
has become aware of the existence of a fraudulently concealed cause
of action, respectively. Conversely, the discovery rule was judicially
crafted in the medical malpractice arena. For instance, in Myrick v.
James,03 the Maine Law Court held that, because section 753 does
not specifically define accrual, "a foreign-object surgical malpractice
action accrues.., when the plaintiff discovers, or, in the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence, should discover the presence of the
foreign object in her body."'" According to the Myrick court, be-
cause no explicit legislative opinion existed regarding foreign-object
medical malpractice, it was within the province of the court to "es-
tablish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and
justice.' 05
98. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
99. Id at 370.
100. Id. at 371-72. See also Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. 111. 1988)
(holding that the plaintiff, who repressed all memory of childhood sexual abuse for
over ten years, was permitted to file suit against her father pursuant to the discovery
rule).
101. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (West 1980) ("All civil actions for
malpractice or professional negligence against architects or engineers duly licensed
or registered under Title 32 shall be commenced within 4 years after such malprac-
tice or negligence is discovered .... ").
102. ME. REv. STAT. Am. tit. 14, § 859 (West Supp. 1996-1997). See infra note
186.
103. 444 A.2d 987 (Me. 1982).
104. Id. at 996.
105. Id. at 998 (quoting Molitar v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163
N.E.2d 89, 96 (I11. 1959)). The dissent strongly opposed the majority's decision, stat-
ing that "[s]uch judicial activism as displayed in the instant case is constitutionally
prohibited and contrary to legal precedents of this Court which have stood for more
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More recently, the Legislature enacted a discovery rule to apply
to child sexual abuse cases in Maine. In 1985, the Maine State Leg-
islature enacted title 14, section 752-C, establishing a statute of limi-
tations related specifically to sexual acts toward minors.1 0 6 In 1989,
the Legislature amended this section to include a three year discov-
ery rule."°7 In 1991, the Legislature extended the time for com-
mencement of an action for child sexual abuse based on discovery
from three years to six years."° More important, the application
clause accompanying the 1991 extension of the statute prohibits
plaintiffs from invoking the discovery rule for sexual abuse occur-
ring before 1991.11 Therefore, actions involving sexual abuse prior
to 1991 are to be considered under the previous statute of limita-
tions, which does not include a discovery rule.
Maine's discovery rule, as a response to the increasingly recog-
nized child sexual abuse epidemic, left a hole through which many
meritorious childhood sexual abuse actions will fall because of re-
pressed memories. The Legislature, by incorporating a discovery
rule in section 752-C, evidently recognized the potential problems
associated with repressed memory and sought to provide a remedy
for sexually abused victims by tolling the statute of limitations until
the abuse is discovered. However, the Legislature recognized re-
pression only to the extent that it related to abuse occurring after
1991. Perhaps the legislative intent was to draw a line of demarca-
tion in order to prevent an overabundance of child sexual abuse liti-
gation in the judicial system, particularly when the abuse may have
occurred many years prior to filing suit. Consequently, the discov-
ery rule found in section 752-C of the Maine Revised Statutes does
than one hundred and fifty years." Id. at 1004 (Nichols and Dufresne, JJ.,
dissenting).
106. See P.L. 1985, ch. 343, § 1.
107. See P.L. 1989, ch. 292.
108. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp. 1996-1997). This sec-
tion provides that:
Actions based upon sexual intercourse, as defined in Title 17-A, section
556, subsection 1-B, or a sexual act, as defined in Title 17-A, chapter 11,
with a person under the age of majority must be commenced within 12
years after the cause of action accrues, or within 6 years of the time the
person discovers or reasonably should have discovered the harm, which-
ever occurs later.
Id. (footnote omitted).
109. The 1991 amendment to this Act included an application clause providing
that:
This Act applies to the following actions based upon sexual intercourse or a
sexual act with a person under the age of majority.
1. All actions based upon sexual intercourse or a sexual act occurring after
the effective date of this Act; and
2. All actions for which the claim has not yet been barred by the previous
statute of limitations in force on the effective date of this Act.
P.L. 1991, ch. 551, § 2.
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not apply to those victims who were abused prior to 1991 and who
suffered from repression; they must abide by the previous statute of
limitations. Thus, victims of abuse that occurred prior to 1991 are
left without a legal remedy if the statute of limitations has run.
For instance, in McAfee v. Cole,"' the plaintiff brought an action
alleging that the defendants sexually abused him when he was a mi-
nor. Like Kathleen Nuccio, McAfee contended that he repressed all
memory of the abuse until long after the applicable statute of limita-
tions had expired."' Speaking for the Law Court, Justice Rudman
maintained that, because the alleged sexual abuse occurred prior to
1991, "the discovery rule of the 1991 Act only applies to McAfee's
claims if, pursuant to subsection 2, they were not already barred by
the previous statute of limitations."' "12 The court concluded that be-
cause McAfee's claim was, indeed, barred by the previous statute of
limitations, he was without a remedy."13 Similarly, in Nuccio, Kath-
leen's cause of action had expired by 1975 under the statute of limi-
tations in effect when she reached majority."14 Therefore, the
discovery clause, pursuant to subsection 2 of the 1991 amendment,
did not apply to her claim." 5
Notably, in McAfee, the court declined to "announce a judicially
crafted discovery rule applicable to the predecessor of section 752-
C.""' 6 Then, in Nuccio, Maine's highest court once again held
steadfast to its policy that once the Legislature has specifically ad-
dressed an issue, "and no other statutory provision applies," it is
inappropriate for the court to render an inconsistent judgment.117
According to the court's rationale, the imposition of a judicially
crafted discovery rule applicable to the previous statute of limita-
tions would improperly circumvent the explicit statutory scheme
and legislative policy in child sexual abuse cases.
C. Equitable Estoppel
1. The Common Hurdles Encountered Under the Doctrine of
Equitable Estoppel by Victims of Child Sexual Abuse
Who Have Repressed Memories
"Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a person is precluded,
because of his own prior conduct, from asserting a defense that he
110. 637 A.2d 463 (Me. 1994).
111. See id. at 465.
112. Id. at 466.
113. See id
114. See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1334 (Me. 1996).
115. See id
116. McAfee v. Cole, 637 A.2d at 466. In his dissent, Justice Dana maintained
that the court could legitimately determine when a cause of action accrued "[i]n the
absence of explicit legislative direction ...." Id. at 467 (Dana, J., dissenting).
117. Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d at 1334.
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otherwise would have had."11 When a civil action for child sexual
abuse would otherwise be barred by a statute of limitations defense,
survivors may invoke equitable principles in an attempt to estop de-
fendants from asserting that defense. 19 The recurring legal hurdles
for adult survivors asserting their claims under equitable estoppel
are to prove the following: that the defendant's conduct caused the
subsequent delay in filing the action; 120 that the reliance on the de-
fendant's misrepresentations was reasonably justified;' 2' and, fi-
nally, that the plaintiff forms an intent to seek legal redress during
the prescriptive period."z
First, plaintiffs often fail to prove that the defendant's conduct
caused the subsequent delay in filing a cause of action. In Smith v.
Smith,"2' for instance, the court held that the defendant/father was
not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations de-
fense because his daughter did not establish that the defendant had
prevented her from suing for the alleged abuse.' -4 The court con-
cluded that the "post-traumatic neurosis" from which the daughter
suffered "was an unintended consequence of the assaults for which
she now seeks damages.'25 According to the court, the plaintiff's
injury was caused by the alleged sexual abuse, an intentional tort;
"[i]t did not result from a separate and independent wrong. The
doctrine of equitable estoppel usually comes into play when some
conduct by a defendant after his initial wrongdoing has prevented
the plaintiff from discovering or suing upon the initial wrong.' ' 26
Second, plaintiffs are routinely unable to prove that their reliance
on the defendants' misrepresentations was reasonably justified. In
Doe v. Roe,'27 the plaintiff argued that the "defendant should be
equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations defense
118. Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 217 (citation omitted).
119. See Lamm, supra note 23, at 2198 (explaining that inherent in equitable es-
toppel arguments by child abuse survivors is the belief that "the psychological injury
complained of[,]" namely repression, "is exactly what caused [the plaintiff's] delay in
filing suit"). See also DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 377 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (noting one survivor's statement that, as child victims, they were under the
power and authority of the defendant abuser and were "subject to coercion, duress,
menace, threat and fear of harm from defendant... should she tell or attempt to tell
others of said acts").
120. See Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1987). See also infra notes 123-
26 and accompanying text.
121. See Doe v. Roe, 596 N.Y.S.2d 620,621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). See also infra
notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
122. See DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). See
also supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text; infra notes 131-35 and accompany-
ing text.
123. 830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987).
124. See id. at 13.
125. Id
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. 596 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
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because it was his conduct that induced her to refrain from taking
earlier action."'" The court concluded, however, that the
"[d]efendant's alleged fraudulent conduct may have facilitated ac-
cess to plaintiff and may have managed to keep the alleged sexual
abuse secret, but it did not directly give rise to the injuries for which
plaintiff seeks recovery.' 129 Thus, the plaintiff could "not avail her-
self of equitable estoppel because she failed to establish.., that she
was justified in relying on his conduct or misrepresentations."' 3
Finally, claimants consistently fail to prove an intent to seek legal
redress within the prescriptive time period. The plaintiff in DeRose
v. Carswell, 3' in addition to her attempt to invoke the discovery
rule as previously discussed, argued that the defendant's "conduct
estops him to assert the statute of limitations."' 32 The plaintiff con-
tended that during the time in which she was abused, she "was
under the dominance of [the] defendant, and subject to coercion,
duress, menace, threat, and fear of harm from defendant.., should
she tell or attempt to tell others of said acts.' 1 33 The court con-
cluded that the "fundamental problem with DeRose's estoppel ar-
gument [was] that she did nothing to pursue her claims even after
[defendant's] conduct ceased."'" This problem was based on the
fact that the alleged abuse terminated during DeRose's minority,
during which time the statute of limitations was tolled, thus giving
DeRose the "benefit of the full limitations period."'135 In other
words, because plaintiff was aware of the harm done to her during
the prescriptive period and had a right to sue based on that harm
but did not, her estoppel argument must fail.
In some instances survivors have attempted to invoke the equita-
ble estoppel doctrine by arguing that the gravity of the alleged tor-
tious conduct of the defendant was so severe as to give rise to
estoppel. Still, courts, in denying equitable relief to plaintiffs who
have allegedly suffered from childhood sexual abuse, have said that
the "gravity of the alleged tortious conduct of the defendants, in and
of itself," is insufficient to give rise to estoppel.136 Thus, in the ab-
sence of the above criteria or a demonstration of "fraud, misrepre-
sentation, threat, or deception[,]" defendants are generally not
128. Id. at 621.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
132. Id. at 377.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608,608-09 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff, who was allegedly abused as a minor, could not invoke equita-
ble estoppel based on the gravity of the defendant's conduct).
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estopped from invoking the statute of limitations defense.1 37 Ac-
cording to one scholar, despite judicial reluctance to employ the eq-
uitable estoppel doctrine in childhood sexual abuse cases, "equitable
estoppel remains the only intellectually honest and comprehensive
method to guarantee survivors a meaningful right of access to the
legal system.' 13
2. The Equitable Estoppel Argument in Nuccio
In Nuccio, Kathleen's primary argument on appeal to the Law
Court was that equitable estoppel should bar Luke Nuccio from as-
serting the statute of limitations defense.139 There is no Maine pre-
cedent to support Kathleen's effort to bar the statute of limitations
defense in a child sexual abuse case based on equitable principles.
Nevertheless, Kathleen described equitable estoppel as an exception
to the statute of limitations and relied on the historical development
of equitable principles espoused in Maine case law to support her
argument that equitable estoppel should be permitted to bar a party
from raising a statute of limitations defense in child sexual abuse
cases.
14 0
Generally, equitable principles have been considered by Maine
courts in cases involving fraudulent concealment of a cause of ac-
tion,14' undue influence and duress, 42 and misrepresentation. 43
According to the Law Court in Townsend v. Appel:1- "
The gist of an estoppel barring the defendant from invoking
the defense of the statute of limitations is that the defendant
has conducted himself in a manner which actually induces the
plaintiff not to take timely legal action on a claim. The plain-
tiff thus relies to his detriment on the conduct of the defend-
ant, by failing to seek legal redress while the doors to the
courthouse remain open to him. Only upon a demonstration
that the plaintiff had in fact intended to seek legal redress on
his claim during the prescriptive period can his failure to file
suit be specifically attributed to the defendant's conduct.1 45
137. Id.
138. Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 218.
139. See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1131, 1332 (Me. 1996).
140. See Brief of the Appellant at 6-8, Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331 (Me.
1996) (No. FED-95-518).
141. Se4 e.g., Bishop v. Little, 3 Me. 405, 403 (1825); Livermore Falls Trust &
Banking Co. v. Riley, 108 Me. 17, 23-25, 78 A. 980, 982 (1911).
142. See e.g., Bither v. Packard, 115 Me. 306, 98 A. 929 (1916).
143. See e.g., Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534 (Me. 1977);
Hanusek v. S. Maine Med. Ctr., 584 A2d 634 (Me. 1990).
144. 446 A.2d 1132 (Me. 1982).
145. Id at 1134 (citations omitted).
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In addition, a plaintiff's reliance on a defendant's conduct must be
reasonable in order to invoke the doctrine. 146
In Nuccio, Kathleen argued that the severity of her father's con-
duct justified her failure to file a timely action. 47 According to
Kathleen, because Luke murdered the family's pets in her presence,
"stuffed her in an oat bin;... held her upside down over an outdoor
privy; . . . struck her in the head so hard she later needed sur-
gery[,]"" and "held a chisel against [her] throat in the workshed...
and ordered [her] not to tell or he would cut [her] throat[,]' 49 this
behavior was "sufficient to induce the plaintiff not to take legal action
on her claim.' 5 0 Furthermore, Kathleen maintained that she rea-
sonably relied upon her father's conduct and threats and that his
conduct "caused her traumatic amnesia," which ultimately resulted
in her delayed cause of action.'' In her brief to the Law Court,
146. See Hanusek v. S. Maine Med. Ctr., 584 A.2d at 636-37. In Hanusek, a medi-
cal malpractice action, a patient was not permitted to employ equitable principles to
estop the defendant from asserting the statute of limitations after the alleged negli-
gence on the part of the hospital caused the plaintiff avoidable heart damage. See id.
at 637. The court concluded that the plaintiff's forbearance in filing suit based on a
statement by defendant's staff was "not reasonable as a matter of law." Id. (empha-
sis added). Pursuant to Maine law, "[eJstoppel flows from the actual consequences
produced by the conduct of A upon B regardless of whether A subjectively intended
the consequences, and which resulted because, objectively evaluated, B has justifia-
bly relied upon A's conduct." Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d at 538-39.
The purpose of estoppel is to "prevent[ ] a defendant from asserting the statute of
limitations when the defendant has acted to induce the plaintiff to reasonably refrain
from commencing timely legal action that the plaintiff otherwise would have taken."
Vacuum Sys. v. Bridge Constr. Co., 632 A.2d 442, 444 (Me. 1993).
147. See Brief of the Appellant at 11, Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331 (Me. 1996)
(No. FED-95-518).
148. Id. at 12.
149. IL at 5.
150. Id. at 12 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Law Court summarized
the facts presented before the trial court:
Luke repeatedly sexually abused Kathleen, born on July 1, 1949, from the
age of 3 to the age of 13 years. When Kathleen was approximately three
years of age, Luke drowned kittens and killed the family dog in her pres-
ence. When she was approximately five or six, he forced her head down
the opening in the toilet of an outhouse. The single threat to Kathleen's
life occurred when she was ten years of age, when Luke held a sharp chisel
to her throat and threatened that if she ever told anyone of the abuse, he
would cut her throat. Throughout her childhood, Kathleen suffered fre-
quent beatings and verbal abuse by Luke, with the last beating occurring
when she was 17 years of age and requiring surgery to her ear.
Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1333 (Me. 1996).
151. Brief of the Appellant at 14. Kathleen argued that the report by her psychi-
atrist provided "the evidentiary basis for application of the 'causal connection'
prong." I&e at 13. In that report, the doctor noted a "clear correlation between the
repeated ongoing acts of violence directed towards [the plaintiff] ... and the pa-
tient's protracted amnesia for most of her traumatic sexual experiences ... ." Id. at
13 (citing Maier Aft., Report p. 8). Kathleen contended that the "threats and vio-
lence inflicted upon [her], with the express intention of assuring her silence, consti-
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Kathleen did not address her intent, if any, to seek legal redress
within the prescriptive period, but she insisted that both her "fear
and the amnesia were reasonable and expected consequences of the
Defendant's actions .... "15
In support of her argument that equitable principles should be
invoked in child sexual abuse cases involving repressed memory,
Kathleen noted Fager v. Hundt,153 where the Indiana Supreme
Court applied equitable principles to a child abuse case when the
victim had experienced traumatic amnesia. Kathleen concluded that
her father's intentional violent conduct and threats caused her to
repress her memories and, ultimately, induced her failure to file a
timely cause of action."5 Based on Eager, Kathleen asserted that
"threats and violence to a small child, designed to secure her silence,
so graphic and forceful as to cause traumatic amnesia, are well
above the level of misconduct necessary to invoke principles of es-
toppel."' 55 According to Kathleen, Luke Nuccio "should not be al-
lowed to obtain the benefit of his misconduct." 156
Luke relied on Dasha v. Maine Medical Center 157 to support his
argument "that the stipulated facts did not meet the elements of
equitable estoppel."' S In Dasha, a medical malpractice action, the
Maine Law Court declined to invoke equitable estoppel to estop the
defendant from pleading the statute of limitations when that defend-
ant's alleged negligence caused subsequent damage to the plaintiff's
brain.159 The court noted that the defendant made no affirmative
misrepresentation nor committed any fraudulent act sufficient to
tute separate conduct which, in the uncontradicted opinion of [the doctor], had a
causal connection to her inability to remember the events upon which her law suit
would be based." Id. at 13.
152. Brief of the Appellant at 14.
153. 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1993). The Fager court concluded that "the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment should be available to estop a defendant from asserting the
statute of limitations 'when he has, either by deception or by a violation of duty,
concealed from the plaintiff material facts thereby preventing the plaintiff from dis-
covering a potential cause of action."' Id. at 251 (quoting Burks v. Rushmore, 534
N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ind. 1989)).
154. See Brief of the Appellant at 14. Kathleen noted that in Fager, the court
considered the relationship between parent and child and recognized the "fraudu-
lent concealment exception to the statute of limitations where a parent's abuse has
caused traumatic amnesia." Id at 11 n.7. In Maine, fraudulent concealment of a
cause of action has been deemed sufficient to avoid the statute of limitations. This
doctrine was legislatively mandated in 1954 by the adoption of title 14, section 859 of
the Maine Revised Statutes. See infra note 186.
155. Reply Brief of the Appellant at 2, Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331 (Me.
1996) (No. FED-95-518).
156. Brief of the Appellant at 14.
157. 665 A.2d 993 (Me. 1995).
158. Brief of Appellee at 11.
159. Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A2d at 995. Justice Lipez's dissent en-
couraged the court to "apply equitable principles to prevent a defendant from using
fraudulent conduct, or the equivalent thereof, to invoke a statutory defense in a man-
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support the assertion of equitable estoppel."6 Furthermore, the
court concluded that although the "statutory scheme may be
deemed unfair or harsh, we decline to circumvent it when the Legis-
lature has explicitly decided the issue." '161
Based on this holding in Dasha, Luke Nuccio concluded that
"there is no showing of an affirmative misrepresentation as is re-
quired to support the application of equitable estoppel nor any
showing of any reliance on the part of the Plaintiff in deciding to
forego seeking legal redress."' 62 Luke argued that because Kath-
leen had, in fact, "no memory of [the] ... threat by her father from
1970, when she obtained her majority, to 1993, it is clear that this
threat in no way induced her to refrain from taking legal action dur-
ing those 23 years."' 63 In addition, Luke asserted that Kathleen
made no showing that she "intended to seek legal redress on her
claim during the prescriptive period."'" He relied upon the follow-
ing rule stated in Townsend v. Appel: 65
Only upon a demonstration that the plaintiff had in fact in-
tended to seek legal redress on his claim during the prescrip-
tive period can his failure to file suit be specifically attributed
to the defendant's conduct. If, on the other hand, the evi-
dence does not indicate that the plaintiff intended to bring
suit, even if the defendant's conduct otherwise satisfies the prin-
ciples of equitable estoppel, the defendant should not be es-
topped from asserting the bar. 66
Fmally, Luke concluded that, "if equitable estoppel does not apply
in a case where a defendant's conduct causes severe brain damage
making a plaintiff incapable of understanding or asserting his legal
rights, [then] estoppel will not apply where a defendant's conduct
causes a plaintiff to repress memory.' 67
In Nuccio, the Law Court held that, because the traumatic amne-
sia was an "unintended consequence" of Luke's willful conduct,
Kathleen did not demonstrate that her father caused her to delay
filing for thirty-two years.' 61 The court concluded that "[t]here is no
evidence in this record that Luke continued to utter threats or dis-
play violence toward Kathleen when, by reason of her majority, she
was no longer under his control."' 6 9 According to the court's rea-
ner so unjust that the Legislature could not have intended the result." Id. at 996
(Lipez, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
160. See iuL at 995.
161. Id. at 996.
162. Brief of Appellee at 12.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 15.
165. 446 A.2d 1132 (Me. 1982).
166. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
167. Brief of Appellee at 11.
168. Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1335 (Me. 1996).
169. Id.
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soning, Kathleen's repression, allegedly caused by her father's vio-
lent conduct and threats, did not warrant invocation of equitable
estoppel to bar Luke's statute of limitations defense. Maintaining
that" '[e]quitable estoppel is a doctrine that should be carefully and
sparingly applied,"'17 the Law Court refused to invoke equitable
estoppel to bar the statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse
cases where the survivor has repressed memories of the abuse as a
result of the defendant's threats of violence and generally violent
nature.
IV. DIscussIoN OF THE Nuccio V. Nuccic STANDARD: WHY
THE DOCrRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CANNOT
APPLY IN CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
AND REPRESSION
State legislatures have responded to our national childhood sex-
ual abuse epidemic by invoking statutory provisions, like the
delayed discovery rule, to enable survivors to file claims after the
applicable statute of limitations has expired. This response has al-
lowed survivors, who have repressed their memories of the abuse, to
pursue their claims once they have discovered the harm or the cause
of that harm.
Maine has taken a step in this direction by enacting title 14, sec-
tion 752-C of the Maine Revised Statutes which provides a delayed
discovery clause in actions involving sexual acts towards minors,
thereby tolling the statute of limitations. This effort, however, has a
very serious short-coming in that it refuses to recognize incidents of
child sexual abuse that occurred prior to 1991; it essentially excludes
potentially valid claims that are barred by the previous and more
restrictive statute of limitations. In Nuccio, the applicable statute
had no discovery clause. Thus, Kathleen Nuccio had six years after
she attained majority to file her claim before the statute expired,
regardless of whether she was aware of the abusive acts committed
against her.
Kathleen was not given the benefit of the discovery rule for survi-
vors of child sexual abuse enacted in 1989, which was subsequently
extended in 1991, even though she filed her complaint in 1993. Ac-
cording to the law, her claim was barred under the previous statute
of limitations because the abuse she suffered occurred prior to 1991.
Consequently, any legal remedy available to Kathleen was extin-
guished long before she had conscious knowledge of her potential
cause of action. The court's strict adherence to the statute of limita-
tions in Nuccio is based on the fact that the Legislature has already
170. L at 1334 (quoting Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 995 (Me.
1995)).
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spoken to this issue specifically. Accordingly, a judicially created
discovery rule straying from the legislation would be inappropriate.
In the absence of a legal remedy, principles of equity are the only
remaining remedies available for people like Kathleen Nuccio. On
this basis, Kathleen argued that she was entitled to an equitable es-
toppel remedy to estop the defendant from raising the statute of
limitations defense. According to the dissent in Dasha, it is appro-
priate to "apply equitable principles to prevent a defendant from
using fraudulent conduct, or the equivalent thereof, to invoke a stat-
utory defense in a manner so unjust that the Legislature could not
have intended the result."17' In Townsend v. Appel,7 ' the Law
Court announced the test used to determine whether equitable es-
toppel could bar a defendant from "invoking the defense of the stat-
ute of limitations.' 173 Under this rule, the Law Court concluded
that Kathleen Nuccio could not successfully invoke equitable estop-
pel for reasons directly related to her prolonged inability to "re-
member" the abuse.
The first element under the Townsend standard requires that the
defendant's actions directly induce the plaintiff not to take timely
action. In Nuccio, Kathleen alleged that her father repeatedly sexu-
ally abused her, engaged in generally violent behavior around her,
and threatened to harm her if she told anyone of his conduct.
Therefore, because Luke threatened his daughter's life if she ever
told of the abuse, such conduct could be construed to have induced
Kathleen not to take timely action on her claim.'74 The effect of
Kathleen's repressed memories, however, obscures the potentially
direct link between Luke's conduct and Kathleen's failure to file. In
this case, repression, rather than Luke's abusive behavior, appears
to be the factor that directly induced Kathleen not to take timely
action and, hence, precludes the application of equitable estoppel
under Townsend.
The second element under Townsend, a requirement that the
plaintiff rely to her detriment on the defendant's conduct, is not met
in Nuccio because Kathleen did not show that she continued to rely
on her father's threats when the threats ceased or when she physi-
cally moved away from home. In fact, it can be inferred from the
Law Court's decision that Kathleen led a very normal and produc-
tive life and did not present evidence of a detriment related to any
171. Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d at 996 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
172. 446 A.2d 1132 (Me. 1982).
173. 1& at 1134.
174. See Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d at 993. Consistent with the ration-
ale of the Dasha dissent, fairness and justice demand that, where there is a direct
link between the conduct of the defendant and the resulting inability of the plaintiff
to pursue her claim due to repression, an equitable remedy should be available to
avoid an unjust result. See Ud at 996.
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reliance on Luke's conduct."75 The court's characterization of reli-
ance in repression cases does not consider repression to be a mani-
festation of the reliance itself. Arguably, Kathleen's repression was
a result of her reliance on Luke's threats and abusive conduct. Con-
sequently, because of the repression, Kathleen was unable to mani-
fest the requisite reliance under the Townsend rule.
Finally, Kathleen's intent to seek legal redress within the prescrip-
tive period, the last requirement of equitable estoppel enunciated by
the Townsend court, is absent from this case only because Luke's
violent conduct and the threat to Kathleen's life caused Kathleen to
repress these events in her mind, leaving her unable to form this
intent.176 It is not reasonable under these circumstances to expect
Kathleen to have intended to seek legal redress during the past
thirty years because she was completely unaware of the existence of
the abuse and its effects at that time. Once she did become aware of
the abuse, however, she filed her action in just over a year. Based
on this analysis, the Law Court reached the appropriate result in
refusing to apply equitable estoppel to this case, but only because
the Townsend test is inapplicable to repression cases. Thus, an
abuse victim who suffered from repression would be unable, under
most circumstances, to invoke equitable estoppel.
If Kathleen Nuccio had not repressed her memories and had re-
lied to her detriment on the conduct of her father "by failing to seek
legal redress while the doors to the courthouse remaine[d] open to
[her,]"' "V the Law Court may have deemed equitable estoppel an
appropriate remedy. Unfortunately, due to the presence of repres-
sion in this case, the applicability of equitable estoppel to child sex-
ual abuse cases in general must be decided at another juncture. In
cases like Nuccio, "the application of the statute [of limitations] ...
has no redeeming rationality"' 78 in light of the disturbing fact that
175. See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d at 1333, 1335. The Law Court noted that:
Kathleen graduated from high school in the top 15% of her class, received
a bachelor's degree in 1972, a master's degree in social work in 1973 and a
doctorate in 1987. She has, since 1973, held a variety of professional posts,
including that of a college professor, a caseworker, a research associate and
a consultant.
Id. at 1333. In other words, Kathleen led a very productive life and showed little
sign of being abused as a child. But see PENDERGRASr, supra note 19, at 116 n.0
(stating that "[e]ven Freud, the father of repressed.memory theory, believed that
large-scale repression used up so much of a person's limited store of energy that it
preempted normal functioning as a human being"). Arguably, Kathleen did, in fact,
show signs of her abusive childhood experiences. "Since 1970, Kathleen has been
treated on both an inpatient and outpatient basis for numerous psychological afflic-
tions including depression, multiple personality disorder and post-traumatic stress
disorder." Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d at 1333.
176. See, e.g., Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d at 997 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
177. Townsend v. Appel, 446 A.2d at 1134.
178. Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 655 A.2d at 998 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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someone "can so successfully avoid liability for alleged
misconduct."' 79
V. A RECOMMENDATION FOR AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
Although equitable estoppel may not apply in Nuccio, Kathleen
may have succeeded in defeating Luke's summary judgment had she
invoked the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The Law Court did
not consider the fraudulent concealment doctrine in Nuccio primar-
ily because the issue was not presented. Nevertheless, in her brief to
the Law Court, Kathleen did allude to fraudulent concealment in
support of her argument that an equitable remedy was warranted.18 0
Her authority for this proposition was Fager v. Hundt, 18' a case re-
viewed by the Indiana Supreme Court in 1993.
In Fager, an adult woman brought a tort action against her father
for sexual abuse during her minority."s Like Kathleen Nuccio, the
plaintiff in Fager contended that the sexual abuse she suffered at the
hands of her father caused her to repress memories of such abuse
until she was thirty-six years old.' 83 The Indiana Supreme Court
applied the fraudulent concealment doctrine, explaining that "the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment should be available to estop a
defendant from asserting the statute of limitations 'when he has,
either by deception or by a violation of duty, concealed from the
plaintiff material facts thereby preventing the plaintiff from discov-
ering a potential cause of action." '  In other words, the court rec-
ognized that "[b]ecause of the natural and legal obligations of
parents to protect and care for their children .... childhood injury
from the intentional felonious act of a parent" warrants employment
of the fraudulent concealment doctrine after a parent has fraudu-
lently concealed the felonious act from the child, preventing the
child from discovering a potential cause of action.' 8 5
The doctrine of fraudulent concealment was adopted by the
Maine Legislature in title 14, section 859, of the Maine Revised Stat-
179. Burpee v. Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1991). Generally speak-
ing, in addressing issues of childhood sexual abuse, courts maintain that the "law,
not feelings, must govern us-or there will be no law at all." Id. at 362.
180. See Brief of the Appellant at 11 n.7, Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1131 (Me.
1996) (No. FED-95-518).
181. 610 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. 1993).
182. See idL at 248.
183. See id. at 252.
184. IL at 251 (quoting Burks v. Rushmore, 534 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ind. 1989)).
According to the Fager Court, "the fraudulent concealment exception does not es-
tablish a new date for the commencement of the statute of limitations, but rather
creates an equitable exception." Id. On remand, the trial court was to determine
"whether the defendant's conduct, by deception or violation of duty, operated to
conceal material facts from the plaintiff, preventing her from commencing" her ac-
tion within the prescribed period. Id at 253.
185. Id. at 251.
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utes.186 Similar to the discovery rule for sexual acts towards minors
stated in section 752-C, the fraudulent concealment provision pro-
vides that a person may bring an action within six years after the
person wronged discovers that he has a cause of action. In Maine, it
is understood that:
[T]o prevail in a claim that a cause of action has been fraudu-
lently concealed, a party.. . "must establish both a conceal-
ment and a fraudulent intent or design to prevent discovery of
facts giving rise to [its] cause of action. Furthermore, [a party]
must show that the defendant had actual knowledge of a fact
before the defendant can be chargyed with an intent or design
to conceal it from the plaintiff."''
Although Maine has never had an occasion to apply the fraudu-
lent concealment doctrine to a childhood sexual abuse case, this
doctrine is the last equitable remedy available to victims of child
sexual abuse who have repressed memories. In Nuccio, Kathleen
potentially could have barred her father from raising the statute of
limitations had she asserted the fraudulent concealment doctrine.
She could have argued that her father, by violating a natural or legal
duty to protect his minor daughter, manifested a fraudulent intent to
prevent her discovery-or recognition-of the abuse by threatening
her life if she told anyone of his conduct. However, Kathleen may
have had difficulty proving that the conduct was concealed from her
because she was physically awake and aware of the conduct when it
occurred. In addition, she may have had difficulty proving that her
father acted to conceal the facts from her for over thirty years. Nev-
ertheless, Kathleen could have argued that, because of her repressed
memories, she was unaware of the abuse for thirty years while her
father was aware of his conduct. In sum, evidence of such fraudu-
lent intent and concealment would warrant invocation of the fraudu-
lent concealment doctrine on behalf of Kathleen. Furthermore,
fraudulent concealment could have applied because Kathleen filed
her claim within six years upon discovering her cause of action.
At a minimum, fraudulent concealment would have enabled
Kathleen to defeat her father's summary judgment motion based on
his knowledge of the sexual abuse and her inability to remember the
186. Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 859 (West Supp. 1996-1997). This section
provides:
If a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause
thereof from the person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is committed which
entitles any person to an action, the action may be commenced at any time
within 6 years after the person entitled thereto discovers that he has just
cause of action, except as provided in section 3580.
Id. (emphasis added).
187. Bangor Water Dist. v. Malcolm Pirnie Eng'rs, 534 A.2d 1326, 1329 (Me.
1988) (quoting Alexander v. Gerald E. Morrissey, Inc., 399 A.2d 503, 506 (Vt.
1979)).
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abuse for an extended period of time. Application of the doctrine at
this stage in the suit operates to level the playing field between the
parties. The "plaintiff still carries the burden to substantiate her al-
legations of abuse and, if challenged, to validate the phenomenon of
memory repression itself and the admissibility of evidence flowing
therefrom. '"1"s In Maine, application of the fraudulent concealment
doctrine in child abuse cases involving repression would at least
bring a sense of fairness to the present arbitrary and discriminatory
discovery rule, permitting victims of abuse prior to 1991 to proceed
with a cause of action based on equitable principles once the abuse
is discovered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Certainly, the Law Court's reluctance to create a judicially crafted
discovery rule applicable to the previous statute of limitations in this
case is justifiable because the Legislature has already explicitly ad-
dressed this issue. Likewise, the court's refusal to apply equitable
estoppel is understandable because the evidence of repression in
Nuccio makes application of the Townsend equitable estoppel test
virtually impossible. Unfortunately, the Law Court did not consider
fraudulent concealment as a potential bar to the statute of limita-
tions in child sexual abuse cases involving repression, the last viable
hope for Kathleen Nuccio, because the issue was not presented.
Kathleen Nuccio is reliving her abuse thirty-two years later, not
because she wants to, but because her recovered memories bear an
inevitable truth about her childhood. Regrettably, she is without a
legal remedy and, according to the Law Court's decision, without an
equitable remedy as well. According to one recently published arti-
cle on child sexual abuse, "[t]he major difference between child
abuse cases and all others is this: Those who make the decisions-
be they judges, juries, social workers, police officers or the general
public-too often act as though the 'issue' were on trial, not the
facts."'189 Admittedly, "child sexual abuse is not [merely] an 'issue,'
... [it] is a fact-a hideous, foul fact that traumatizes our culture just
as it traumatizes individual victims."'" For the very reason that
child sexual abuse is a hideous fact of our culture, it is vital that our
communities provide a forum for abuse victims to adjudicate their
claims. Child sexual abuse is a public matter; it is not a personal
problem that can be avoided or ignored by state legislatures and the
courts.
Thus, until the Maine Legislature extends the discovery rule to
the previous statute of limitations and provides for effective evalua-
tion of each child sexual abuse case based on its unique facts, the
188. McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797, 800 (N.H. 1994).
189. Vachss, supra note 14, at 5.
190. Id.
[Vol. 49:235
1997] REPRESSED MEMORY 265
judiciary should invoke equitable remedies, like fraudulent conceal-
ment, on behalf of abuse victims. Under existing Maine law, certain
adult survivors of child sexual abuse who experience repressed
memory are arbitrarily and unjustly denied the opportunity to face
their abusers in court and to hold them legally responsible for their
abusive conduct. All child sexual abuse victims deserve to be heard.
Perhaps one day the law will listen.
Christina J. D'Appolonia

